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In May 1984, the Supreme Court held that Title VII I of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 prohibited law firms from discriminating against wo-
men and minorities when extending offers of partnership to associates
employed by the firm. 2 The ramifications of this decision, Hishon v. King
& Spalding, will not only affect law firm partnerships but also extend to
brokerage houses, accounting and architectural firms, and all other busi-
ness entities that operate as partnerships or professional corporations.
Although, at present, the scope of the decision is unclear, it eventually
will be drawn into focus as the courts set the limitations, if any, on civil
rights laws governing other aspects of firm management.
I. HISTORICAL NON-PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN AND MINORITIES IN LAW
FIRMS
The Court's opinion does not address the limited participation of
women and minorities in the legal profession. The historical absence of
women and minorities in law firms must be discussed in order to fully
understand the remedies which may be formulated to cure the problem.
Hishon's brief to the Supreme Court discussed at length the histori-
cal non-participation of women in the legal profession.3 To illustrate
this point, the brief stated that Harvard Law School did not admit wo-
men until 1950, Notre Dame Law School, not until 1969, and Washing-
ton and Lee Law School, not until 1972. 4 Other statistical data
* Partner, Sherman & Howard, Denver, Colorado; J.D., Harvard Law School
(1974); B.A., Kansas State University (1970).
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e17 (1982). Title VII states in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer. . .[t]o fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
Id. at § 2000e-2 (a)(l).
2. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984).
3. Brief for Petitioner at 18-24, Hishon v. King & Spalding, 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioner].
4. C. EPSTEIN, Women in Law 50 (1981). Dean Griswold's comments on the admis-
sion of women to Harvard Law School were:
Women have made a place for themselves in the law, and we now have many
women serving with distinction on the bench and at the bar. Women have come a
long way since they were first admitted to membership in the American Bar Asso-
ciation in 1918.
Opportunities for women in the law still are limited, however, and the
Faculty is well aware that many able men are turned away from our doors every
DENVER UNIVERSITY LI W REVIEW
emphasized that from 1965 to 1980 the number of women graduating
from law schools in the United States increased from 367 to 10,754. 5 By
1981, approximately 35% of the students in the nation's law schools
were women. 6 A 1982 survey by the National Law Journal of 151 large
law firms employing approximately 5% of the lawyers in the United
States found that thirty-two of those firms had no women partners, 106
had no black partners, and 133 had no Hispanic partners. 7 By 1983,
37.7% of the 127,000 law students were women and 9.3% were mem-
bers of a minority.8 Considering the increasing numbers of women and
minorities graduating from law schools, the lack of partnerships offered
to these two groups may no longer be justified by the lack of qualified
candidates.
Future court decisions will, of course, focus upon the facts relating
to the particular partnership or professional corporation whose prac-
tices are being challenged. Nevertheless, the historical non-participa-
tion of women and minorities in a variety of professions cannot be
ignored. Particularly for partnerships and professional corporations
that have failed to make any apparent effort to alter the white male
make-up of their enterprises, it seems likely that the historical data will
have significant weight in formulating remedies. If the historical under-
representation of women and minorities as partners in the nation's law
firms continues, these groups will find no incentive to enter the legal
profession and past gains will be jeopardized.9
II. THE COURT'S DECISION IN HIsHON V. KING & SPALDING
A. Facts
In 1972, following her graduation from Columbia University Law
School, Elizabeth A. Hishon accepted an offer of employment with the
Atlanta law firm of King & Spalding. She was the second female lawyer
hired by the firm in its almost one hundred year history.1 0 Hishon al-
leged in her complaint that she and other new lawyers became associates
year. It is our expectation that we will admit only a small number of unusually
qualified women students for the present, at least.
9 HARV. L. REC. No. 2 (Oct. 11, 1949), as cited in 79 HARV. L. REC. No. 3 (Oct. 12, 1984).
In the fall of 1983, 33.8% (554 of 1,639) of the undergraduate law students at Harvard
Law School were women. Of the graduate and special students, 24.8% (42 of 169) were
women. A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, A REVIEW OF LEGAL EDUCA-
TION IN THE UNITED STATES 28 (1984).
5. Brief for Petitioner at 20.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 22 (citing Flaherty, Women and Minorities: The Gains, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 20, 1982
at 1, 8-11).
8. A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, A REVIEW OF LEGAL EDUCA-
TION IN THE UNITED STATES 70-72 (1984).
9. Brief Amicus Curiae for American Assoc. of Univ. Women at 16-17, Hishon v.
King & Spalding, 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984).
10. The first woman hired by King & Spalding was an honor graduate of the Univer-
sity of Georgia and was employed as an associate in 1944. She was not elevated to the
partnership until 1977-thirty-three years after joining the firm. She was the firm's only
permanent associate and during that time more than 50 men hired after her were pro-
moted into the partnership. Brief for Petitioner at 21.
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with the understanding that they would be considered for partnership
on a fair and non-discriminatory basis after five or six years of satisfac-
tory performance.I 1 Hishon alleged that she was told that as long as an
associate's work was consistently evaluated by the firm as satisfactory,
elevation to partner was just a "matter of course." 12 Finally, Ms. Hishon
alleged that her annual evaluations were satisfactory and she was never
told her work was "unsatisfactory or that she had failed to perform pro-
fessionally at the expected level to become a partner in the firm."' 13 Ms.
Hishon was rejected for partnership and subsequently discharged from
the firm pursuant to the firm's "up or out" policy. She sued King &
Spalding for sex-based discrimination under Title VII. Ms. Hishon
sought back pay and compensation for loss of future earnings in lieu of
reinstatement and promotion to partnership.
14
In its answer, King & Spalding alleged that invitations to join a part-
nership were not an employment practice subject to Title VII. 1 5 Fur-
ther, they denied any assurances that Ms. Hishon would become a
partner and specifically alleged she was told "of her shortcomings in
dealing with clients' business and her inability and unwillingness to de-
velop professional and personal relationships which would make her a
full and complete lawyer."'
16
The district court dismissed Ms. Hishon's complaint on the ground
that Title VII was inapplicable to the selection of partners by a partner-
ship. 17 A divided panel for the court of appeals affirmed. 18 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari' 9 to determine whether it was proper
to dismiss a Title VII complaint "alleging that a law partnership discrim-
inated against petitioner, a woman lawyer employed as an associate,
when it failed to invite her to become a partner.''20 The Supreme Court
reversed the lower courts' decisions and held that Ms. Hishon had stated
a claim upon which relief could be granted. Upon remand, the case was
settled.
11. Joint Appendix at 8-9, Hishon Complaint, 8(b), Hishon v. King & Spalding, 104
S. Ct. 2229 (1984).
12. Id. at 9, 8(d).
13. Id. at 10, 11. Because this case was before the Court following a motion to
dismiss under FED. R. Civ. P. 12, the Court accepted all of Ms. Hishon's allegations as
true. 104 S. Ct. at 2233. Thus, the Court had no occasion to provide the lower courts with
any guidance in evaluating the highly subjective criteria involved in partnership decisions.
14. Id. at 19, 22, 25. Ms. Hishon also prayed for reasonable attorneys' fees, costs
and expenses, and a permanent injunction against further discrimination.
15. Joint Appendix at 27, King & Spalding Answer, Fourth Defense, Hishon v. King &
Spalding, 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984).
16. Id. at 33, King & Spalding Answer 12.
17. 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1303 (N.D. Ga. 1980). Because the court held that
Title VII did not apply to partnerships, Hishon's complaint did not invoke the court's
subject matter jurisdiction and was dismissed pursuant to FED. R. CiV. PRO. 12(b)(1). Id. at
1307.
18. 678 F.2d 1022 (1lth Cir. 1982).
19. 459 U.S. 1169 (1983).
20. 104 S. Ct. at 2232. Before Hishon, one court had held that partnership considera-
tion matters were subject to Title VII's prohibitions on national origin and religious dis-
crimination, focusing upon partnerships as an "employment opportunity." Lucido v.
Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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B. The Opinion
The central issue facing the Court was whether consideration for
partnership is one of the "terms, conditions or privileges of employ-
ment" governed by Title VII. Title VII applies to partnerships 2 ' but
requires a minimum of fifteen employees. 2 2 King & Spalding met this
threshold requirement.
The Court characterized an associate's opportunity to become a
partner at King & Spalding as one of the terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment governed by Title VII. 23 Hishon alleged that she was
induced to join the firm by a promise of consideration for partnership
after she served an apprenticeship as an associate.2 4 This promise, if
established at trial, was a benefit provided in the employment contract.
In the alternative, Hishon alleged that, absent a contractual obligation,
consideration for partnership was a privilege of the employment rela-
tionship that was offered to the associates at King & Spalding. 25 The
Court held that contractual benefits and non-contractual privileges may
not be "doled out in a discriminatory fashion."
26
The Court's analytical framework is not new. The cases have long
required employers to make all terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment available to all employees without regard to race, sex, or na-
tional origin.2 7 What is new is the Court's broad definition of
"privileges" of employment. Admission to partnership in a large law
firm is a highly subjective process, only partially dependent upon pure
21. The definition of "person" under Title VII includes partnerships. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(a).
22. An "employer" is any person with 15 or more employees in 20 or more calendar
weeks in the current or preceding year. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
23. 104 S. Ct. at 2233-34.
24. Id. at 2232.
25. Id. at 2234-35. See also White, Women in the Law, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1051, 1106
(1967) ("the prospect of... partnership and the added compensation which it is ex-
pected to bring can offset other detriments of a job, such as compensation, low beginning
pay or undesirable working conditions . . . [so as to] classify the opportunity to compete
for a partnership position as one of the 'privileges' of employment of which the Act
speaks").
26. 104 S. Ct. at 2234.
27. The starting point was McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
The Court set forth the basic framework for analyzing questions of disparate treatment-
the plaintiff must first present a prima facie case of discrimination. This is done by show-
ing: I) the claimant was a member of a protected class; 2) the claimant applied for and was
qualified for a job the employer had available; 3) the claimant, though qualified, was re-
jected; and, 4) the employer continued to seek to fill the job. Id. at 802. The employer
must then "articulate some legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the employee's rejec-
tion." Id. At this point, the burden shifts to the employee who must show that the articu-
lated reason is a mere pretext. Id. at 804. Cases arising on a motion to dismiss, as Hishon,
only deal with the first step in the analysis; whether a prima facie case has been alleged and
whether defenses have been raised. Defenses include the inapplicability of Title VII
(raised here by King & Spalding) or other defenses not addressed to the merits of the
particular plaintiffs claims. Questions as to burden of proof have been litigated exten-
sively. See, e.g., Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). The
basic framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas has remained and is used, without refer-
ence, in Hishon.
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legal skill.2 8 The "privilege" of "consideration for partnership" is not
comparable to the move from apprentice to journeyman, or a promotion
to another non-management position or a first line supervisor's posi-
tion. Generally, only a fraction of new associates remain with a firm to
become partner. When this is coupled with the burgeoning exceptions
to the employment-at-will doctrine, the potential implications for all em-
ployers become inestimable.
2 9
Employers are free to provide or withdraw particular employment
benefits absent some express or implied contract. 30 However, although
a particular benefit may not be a right of employment, it may qualify as a
"privilege" of employment subject to the requirements of Title VII. 3 1
The Court emphasized the allegations in Ms. Hishon's complaint
supporting the conclusion that "the opportunity to become a partner
was part and parcel of an associate's status as an employee at [King &
Spalding]." 3 2 These allegations included the following: (1) associates
could regularly be expected to be considered for partnership while law-
yers outside the firm were not routinely considered; (2) the prospect for
ultimate partnership was used to induce young lawyers to begin working
at King & Spalding; and (3) associates' employment was terminated if
they were not elected to the partnership. 33 The Court concluded that
these allegations, if proved at trial, would be sufficient to establish that
partnership consideration was a privilege of employment and must oc-
cur without regard to sex.
3 4
The Court rejected the arguments of King & Spalding in fairly short
order. The first and strongest argument advanced by King & Spalding
was that the issue of consideration for partnership was beyond the pur-
view of Title VII because elevation to partnership involves a change in
status from an "employee" to an "employer." The Court accepted for
the sake of argument that "a partnership invitation is not itself an offer
of employment,"'3 5 but concluded that Title VII applies nevertheless.
The Court stated:
The benefit a plaintiff is denied need not be employment to fall
within Title VII's protection; it need only be a term, condition
28. See generally Lynch, How Law Firms Select Partners, 70 A.B.A.J. 65 (Oct. 1984) (law
firms select partners through a process that weighs objective and subjective factors).
29. In footnote six of Hishon, ChiefJustice Burger implies that Ms. Hishon's employ-
ment contract might have "afford[ed] a basis for an implied condition that the ultimate
decision would be fairly made on the merits." Hishon, 104 S. Ct. at 2233 n.6. The third
count of Ms. Hishon's complaint alleged breach of contract under Georgia law, pleading
pendent jurisdiction over that claim. Joint Appendix at 7, 16-17, Hishon Complaint 3,
23-25, Hishon, 104 S. Ct. at 2229 (1984). State employment-at-will exceptions are beyond
the scope of this article. Such state law claims may offer a fertile field for litigation of these
issues.
30. 104 S. Ct. at 2234.
31. Id. "A benefit that is part and parcel of the employment relationship may not be
doled out in a discriminatory fashion, even if the employer would be free under the em-
ployment contract simply not to provide the benefit at all." Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 2234-35.
35. Id. at 2235.
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or privilege of employment. It is also of no consequence that
employment as an associate necessarily ends when an associate
becomes a partner. A benefit need not accrue before a per-
son's employment is completed to be a term, condition, or priv-
ilege of that employment relationship.
3 6
The second argument raised by King & Spalding was that Title VII
categorically preempts partnership decisions from review. There is no
direct support for this in the legislative history, and the Court refused to
find such a broad exception.
3 7
King & Spalding's third argument was that applying Title VII to
partnership decisions would infringe upon the constitutional rights of
expression or association of the King & Spalding partners. The Court
acknowledged the distinctive role of lawyers in society, but rejected the
notion that invidious private discrimination could be given affirmative
constitutional protection.
38
Justice Powell filed a separate concurrence. He stated that the rela-
tionship among partners was not subject to Title VII and that the
Court's decision "should not be read as extending Title VII to the man-
agement of a law firm by its partners."139 In footnote three of his con-
currence, he includes such factors as participation in profits or other
compensation, work assignments, bar association, civic or political activ-
ities, acceptance of new clients and a number of other matters as law
firm management issues not subject to Title VII.
4 0
Before discussing the issues left unresolved by Hishon, it is impor-
tant to underscore the undisputed scope of the decision. It must be
remembered that Title VII applies not only to sex discrimination, but
also to discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, and national
origin.4 1 Additionally, the fact that a law firm, accounting firm, architec-
tural firm, brokerage house, medical practice group, or other entity may
be organized as a professional corporation rather than a partnership is
unlikely to be of any significance. 4 2 If a member of a protected class can
plead and prove that he or she received promises such as those de-
scribed by the Court, variations in business organization will not, and
should not, alter the result. 4 3 Thus, any group of professionals with fif-
teen or more nonpartner employees must make its decision to promote
an employee to partner 44 without regard to race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
4 5
36. Id. (emphasis in original).
37. Id. "When Congress wanted to grant an employer complete immunity, it ex-
pressly did so." Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2236.
40. Id. at n.3.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
42. Contra Panker & Davin, Law Partnership Decisions after Hishon v. King & Spalding, 30
PRAc. LAw., July 15, 1984, at 27, 29-30.
43. EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, 736 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1984).
44. The term "partner" is used throughout to include members of a partnership and
shareholders in a professional corporation.
45. Technically this overstates the Hishon holding. A prospective employer would be
490 [Vol. 62:2
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III. KEY ISSUES UNRESOLVED BY HISHON
The remaining issues to be resolved by the courts are whether part-
nerships with fewer than fifteen employees will be affected by the Hishon
ruling and whether management decisions other than decisions regard-
ing elevation to partner will be precluded from review as suggested in
Justice Powell's concurring opinion. A third unresolved issue is the type
of remedies available to litigants in a Hishon type dispute.
A. Size of Firms Affected by Hishon
Title VII expressly regulates entities having fifteen or more employ-
ees. 4 6 At the time the Hishon suit was filed, King & Spalding employed
over fifty partners, approximately fifty associates, plus an unstated
number of staff people. Clearly, the Court was dealing with a large or-
ganization that easily satisfied the threshold requirement of Title VII. In
addition, the Court rejected King & Spalding's argument that subjecting
questions of partnership to Title VII prohibitions would infringe on the
firm's right of association. 47 The Court refused to provide "affirmative
constitutional protections" to discriminatory employment practices mas-
querading as an exercise of freedom of association. 48 In so doing, the
court prevented other organizations from justifying discriminatory prac-
tices on the basis of the right to associate. 49 Consequently, all entities
within the purview of Title VII are within the mandate of Hishon.
1. Partners Counted as Employees or Employers Under Title
VII
The Hishon Court did not address whether partners in a particular
organization should be counted as employees for Title VII purposes.
The Court stated "even if respondent is correct that a partnership invi-
tation is not itself an offer of employment" Title VII is still applicable.
50
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that shareholders (part-
ners) in a professional corporation should not be considered employ-
ees. 5 1 Consequently, the defendant law firm in that case had fewer than
fifteen employees and was outside the purview of Title VII. By treating
free to refuse to state, and in fact could specifically negate, promises regarding considera-
tion for partnership and progress within the firm. As a practical matter, however, one
would expect that representations such as those highlighted by the Supreme Court will
continue to be made on a regular basis. Failure to do that could have a significant impact
upon a firm's ability to recruit new professional employees.
46. See supra note 22.
47. 104 S. Ct. at 2235.
48. Id.
49. For a later Supreme Court decision rejecting freedom of association as justifica-
tion for discriminatory policies toward the admission of women in male-only organiza-
tions, see Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984) (discussed infta notes
62-72 and accompanying text).
50. 104 S. Ct. at 2235.
51. EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, 736 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1984). See albo Burke v. Fried-
man, 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977) (partners in accounting firm held not to be "employ-
ees" under Title VII).
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an offer of partnership as an offer of employment both the issue of
counting partners as employees and the available remedies will be
affected.
The issue of whether partners are counted as employees under Title
VII is important in light of the fact that many state civil rights statutes
often have lower jurisdictional requirements than Title VII. 52 Most
state civil rights statutes encompass the protections of Title VII, and
many also prohibit discrimination on the basis of age and handicap. 5
3
The issue thus becomes whether there is some minimal size partnership
or professional corporation which the courts may choose as a matter of
policy not to regulate, or alternatively, to narrowly prescribe remedies
available to claimants against small enterprises.
The brief filed with the Supreme Court on behalf of King & Spald-
ing emphasizes the unique ethical and practical aspects of lawyer advo-
cacy. Arguments presented include contentions that "lawyers are
entitled to the highest degree of associational freedom," that "the inde-
pendence of the bar is essential," and that applying Title VII to partner-
ship decisions "necessarily would intrude on lawyer-client
confidentiality."' 54 Justice Powell's concurrence implicitly adopts these
notions, although to a lesser degree, stating that "[tihe relationship
among law partners differs markedly from that between employer and
employee."
'55
In contrast, petitioner argued that law partnerships, at least those
the size of King & Spalding, are "big business" and should be regulated
52. Of the states constituting the Tenth Circuit, Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, and
Wyoming have statutes prohibiting discrimination by employers with fewer than fifteen
employees. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-401(3) (two or more employees); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 44-1002(b) (four or more employees); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-2(B) (four or more
employees); Wvo. STAT. § 27-9-102 (two or more employees). But see OKLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-1301 (fifteen or more employees); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-35-2(5) (twenty-five or
more employees).
53. See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402 (prohibiting discrimination based on hand-
icap, race, color, creed, sex, national origin, or ancestry); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1009
(prohibiting discrimination based on race, religion, color, sex, physical handicap, national
origin, or ancestry); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (prohibiting discrimination based on race,
age, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, or physical or mental handicap); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. § 25-1302 (prohibiting discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, na-
tional origin, or handicap); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-35-6 (prohibiting discrimination based
on race, color, sex, age, religion, ancestry, national origin, or handicap); Wyo. STAT. § 27-
9-105 (prohibiting discrimination based on age, sex, race, color, creed, national origin, or
ancestry). Colorado has a misdemeanor statute prohibiting age discrimination against
persons between the ages of 18 and 60. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 8-2-116. Onejudge has inter-
preted this statute as allowing an implied right of private action. Rawson v. Sears Roebuck
& Co., 530 F. Supp. 776 (D. Colo. 1982) (Kane, J.). Colorado appellate courts have yet to
address the issue. But see Silverstein v. Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth Health Services
Corp., 38 Colo. App. 286, 559 P.2d 716 (1976) (no civil action for damages for violating
state statute prohibiting employment discrimination against physically handicapped), rev'd
in part on other grounds, 43 Colo. App. 446, 614 P.2d 891 (1980). Accord Holter v. Moore &
Co., 681 P.2d 962, 965 (Colo. App. 1984) ("Where a statute creates legal duties and pro-
vides a particular means of enforcement, the designated remedy is exclusive and courts are
without authority to impose others.").
54. Brief for Respondents at 17, 21, 24, Hishon v. King & Spalding, 104 S. Ct. 2229
(1984) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Respondents].
55. 104 S. Ct. at 2236.
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as such. 56 Arguments advanced by petitioner included the claim that
whether someone is designated a "partner" or "employee" of the firm
should be of no moment; the focus should be upon the economic reali-
ties of the arrangement. 5 7 Further, petitioner argued that a law partner-
ship the size of King & Spalding is a separate entity which should be
considered the "employer" of a partner for Title VII purposes and that
having an "ownership" interest in firm assets or being paid from "prof-
its" should not alter the primary view of the arrangement as one of em-
ployment. 58 The Court did not need to address these arguments
because King & Spalding met the threshold employee requirement re-
gardless of the number of partners. These arguments undoubtedly will
be repeated in future cases.
The broad policy question remains: Will Hishon extend to partner-
ships with fewer than fifteen employees? One indication as to the direc-
tion the Court may take to answer this question is the interpretation of
section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act. 59 Section 1981 contains nojuris-
dictional size requirement. While discussing the ramifications of this
federal anti-discrimination statute, one commentator has stated:
It is unlikely, however, that § 1981 would be construed to cover
extremely small and personal private employment relationships
such as baby sitters and live-in caretakers. The Supreme Court,
while hinting that 'truly private' associations would be exempt
from coverage under §§ 1981 and 1982, has consistently
skirted the issue.
60
At some point, federal courts, and probably state courts, will be re-
quired to determine the extent to which smaller business relationships
might be exempted from regulation by the discrimination laws.
2. Jurisdictional Size Requirements Under State Law
A key factor in determining whether a partnership containing fewer
than fifteen employees will be subject to anti-discrimination prohibitions
may be whether the regulator is proceeding under federal or state law.
The reason is two-fold: first, many states require fewer than fifteen em-
56. Brief for Petitioners at 15-18. Petitioners noted that in 1980, King & Spalding had
more total lawyers (102) than 98% of all businesses had employees in the United States.
Counting only the 50-plus associate lawyers, King & Spalding still had more employees
than 7o of the businesses in the United States subject to Title VII. Id. at 17-18.
57. Id. at 27-30.
58. Id. at 31-41.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). This section provides equal rights under the law and
states in pertinent part:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be par-
ties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by White citizens, and shall
be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of
every kind and to no other.
Id.
60. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 669 n. 1 (2d Ed.
1983).
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ployees under their own civil rights statutes;61 and second, the federal
courts seem willing to allow the states broad latitude in regulating eco-
nomic relationships. The decision of the Supreme Court in Roberts v.
United States Jaycees,6 2 decided one month after Hishon, is instructive in
this regard.
TheJaycees case involved the issue of whether the Minnesota Human
Rights Act could be applied to strike down the males-only membership
provisions of the United States Jaycees' bylaws. The Court, in striking
down these provisions, categorized freedom of association cases as in-
volving either "intimate association" or "expressive association.' '63 The
Court dichotomized the right of association as comprising the right of
each individual to keep certain personal relationships free from govern-
mental interference, and the right of all individuals to organize into
groups for political, economic, religious, and social purposes. Relation-
ships entitled to constitutional protection as intimate associations in-
volve primarily family matters such as marriage, contraception, and
childrearing.
64
The right to associate for expressive purposes is no more abso-
lute6 5 than the expressed first amendment freedoms of speech, press,
and assembly. The freedom of group life is always subject to some de-
gree of regulation in the public interest. An infringement on associa-
tional interests "unrelated to the suppression of ideas" which serves a
compelling state interest and "cannot be achieved through means signif-
icantly less restrictive of associational freedoms" is allowable. 66 The
Jaycees Court cited Hishon as an example of the failure to establish "any
serious burdens on the male members' freedom of expressive
association. "67
Applying the majority's approach, it seems unlikely that a private
law firm of any size could make a constitutional challenge to state stat-
utes regulating its employment or partnership practices. Thus, regard-
less of whether Section 1981 might be construed as inapplicable to
"extremely small" business relationships, state law is unlikely to be
overturned on federal constitutional grounds for regulating such
arrangements.
Justice O'Connor in herJaycees concurrence defines theJaycees or-
ganization as a commercial enterprise subject to minimal constitutional
protection. 68 She states:
It is only when the association is predominantly engaged in
protected expression that state regulation of its membership
will necessarily affect, change, dilute, or silence one collective
61. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
62. 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984).
63. Id. at 3249-50.
64. Id. at 3250.
65. Id. at 3252.
66. Id. at 3252 (citations omitted).
67. Id. at 3254.
68. Id. at 3258.
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voice that otherwise would be heard. An association must
choose its market. Once it enters the marketplace of commerce
in any substantial degree it loses the complete control over its
membership that it would otherwise enjoy .... 69
Justice O'Connor recognized that the first amendment protects some,
but not all lawyering activity. 70 The practice of law for commercial ends
is not accorded such protection. 7 1 "[N]o First Amendment interest
stands in the way of a State's rational regulation of economic transac-
tions by or within a commercial association."-72 Few lawyers are likely to
argue that the primary reason for their organization is expression of
ideas on matters of public affairs.
It seems highly unlikely that any federal constitutional prohibitions
would limit a state's efforts to prohibit discriminatory practices in law
firms or other commercial enterprises. Likewise, one would not antici-
pate that efforts to apply existing federal legislation to those practices
would run afoul of the Constitution. Questions of size should do little
to prevent an organization from having allegedly discriminatory prac-
tices scrutinized. As discussed below, however, size could have a signifi-
cant impact on issues as to remedies.
B. Impact on Internal Management Decisions
Justice Powell's Hishon concurrence clearly states his view that once
admitted to a partnership, a member of a protected class has no claim
under Title VII for discriminatory decisionmaking in compensation, as-
signment of work, and a variety of other matters. 73 This concurrence
poses what potentially will be the most difficult issue to arise from
Hishon; will courts interfere with operating decisions, and if so, to what
extent.
A recent survey has found that the largest law firm in the country
has 704 lawyers, including 428 associates, and that 202 firms have 100
or more lawyers. 74 While the survey does include legal assistants em-
ployed by those firms it does not include staff members. Accounting
and brokerage firms are frequently at least as large. It is difficult to ar-
gue that each professional's interests in preserving his independence
should allow him to operate his businesses using discriminatory criteria,
particularly in organizations of this magnitude.
69. Id. at 3259.
70. Id. at 3260. "Collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the
courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First Amendment." Id. (citations
omitted).
71. Id. at 3260-6 1. "As a commercial enterprise, the law firm [of King & Spalding]
could claim no First Amendment immunity from employment discrimination laws.
Id.
72. Id.
73. 104 S. Ct. at 2236. By implication, this rationale could also be applied to 42
U.S.C. § 1981 and age discrimination.
74. Tarr, The NLJ 250, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 24, 1984 at 9 (special supplement). The sur-
vey listed King & Spalding as the 108th largest law firm in the United States with 145 total
lawyers, 80 of them associates. Id. at 12.
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Individuals in a business organization of 100 or more professionals
may not even see each other for days. They may never have to work
closely with a majority of their co-workers during their careers, depend-
ing upon their particular specialties and the organization of the busi-
ness. Certainly partners will be deeply interested in the integrity of the
prospective partner, the economic value to the firm of the prospective
partner, and the skill, expertise and leadership abilities of the prospec-
tive partner.7 5 The partnership admission process, while involving a
review of some objective data such as time with the firm and production
of income, also encompasses a number of intangible factors such as per-
sonal integrity and loyalty to the firm. 76 Nonetheless, the notion that
business organizations of this magnitude have some associational right
to exclude individuals on the basis of their membership in a class pro-
tected by Title VII has been rejected by the Supreme Court and should
be rejected by society as a whole.
Whether the courts will adopt Justice Powell's approach is uncer-
tain. Given the intangibles involved in compensation, case assignment,
and overall assessment of any particular partner's value to a business
organization, any effort to invalidate such decisions must proceed with
care. It should be apparent that fashioning a remedy will be difficult;
however, courts have not viewed that as a basis for denying relief.
Courts have looked to the economic realities of a work setting in
resolving other issues of discrimination. In a thorough discussion of the
law under Title VII, the Third Circuit 77 recently applied the hybrid
"right to control/economic realities" test of Title V11 7 8 to an age dis-
crimination claim to determine whether plaintiffs were employees for
the purposes of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. 79 The
court noted that this test looks at the economic realities of the business,
"but focuses upon the employer's right to control the employee as the
most important factor in determining employee status." °8 0 This test
combines the common law principles of agency-the right of the em-
ployer to control the employee-and the "degree of economic depen-
dence" of the employees on the business itself.8 1 The court noted
75. For one lawyer's perspective on these issues, see Lynch, supra note 31.
76. Id. at 65-66.
77. See E.E.O.C. v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1983).
78. Two different standards developed to determine an individual's status as an em-
ployee. First, the "right to control" test, which was based on the common law principles
of agency, determined the status of employees by the degree of control over the individual
exercised by the employer. An individual was held to be an employee if the employer
determined not only what work was to be performed but also how it was to be performed.
Second, the "economic realities" test developed as a result of the limited nature of the
common law test. It recognized other factors, such as opportunities for profit and loss and
investment in facilities, as important when determining whether an individual was an em-
ployee for purposes of social legislation. A narrower hybrid test, combining the common
law "right to control" standard and the "economic realities" standard, was applied to de-
termine status for purposes of Title VII. For a more complete discussion of the develop-
ment of these tests, see id. at 36-38.
79. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1982).
80. 713 F.2d at 37 (citation omitted).
81. Id.
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eleven other factors for consideration under this hybrid test, including
the occupation of the individual, degree of supervision or control, man-
ner of payment, method of terminating the relationship, annual leave
afforded, and integration of the employee's work into the overall enter-
prise.8 2 If this analysis is applied to professional partnerships, one
would expect that at least some would be treated as employers with indi-
vidual partners being treated as employees for Title VII purposes.
At some point, it would certainly seem that a law or other partner-
ship could organize itself in such a way that its management decisions
might be subject to Title VII. The larger the enterprise, and the fewer
the individuals who are involved in the decisionmaking/management
process, the stronger the argument for Title VII oversight becomes.
These entities do not publish their partnership agreements or manage-
ment manuals; it is thus not possible to make comparisons or generaliza-
tions as to management structures. To the extent management
decisions are centralized and the latitude of individual partners reduced,
as seems to occur in the larger organizations, the considerations would
have a substantial impact on the vitality of Justice Powell's
interpretation.
At the other end of the size spectrum, it must be asked whether
state law or Section 1981 should be construed to require a partnership
of two professionals with three professional and two non-professional
employees to admit one of the professional employees into their part-
nership. It is difficult to assess in the abstract where such a line might be
drawn. Few, if any, would attempt to justify discrimination. It does
seem, however, that at some point the shared management arrangement
of a law firm, accounting firm, or other enterprise becomes sufficiently
small that serious questions must be answered before federal or state
statutes are construed to restrict decisionmaking as to the admission of
individuals into the ownership and operation of a small business.
83
IfJustice Powell's approach is ultimately followed by the courts, one
would have to ask whether there would be any real significance to Hishon
at all. Decisions relating to compensation, acceptance, and assignment
of work, and approval of commitments in bar association, civic, or polit-
ical activities, have a major impact upon the value of membership in a
82. id.
83. This issue may prove to be more theoretical than real. Smaller law firms seem to
be more ad hoc in their hiring and other practices than larger law firms. A firm which
interviews applicants at a number of law schools during the "fall season" will be far more
likely to do the bulk of its hiring at a particular time and in turn have more formalized
practices in the progress to partnership. Failure to follow standard operating procedures
may present a problem for the large firm in defending a claim of discrimination. A smaller
firm which has fewer formalized policies or practices may be able to justify variations in
approach more readily. Additionally, a smaller law or accounting firm will more closely
approximate the collegial environment, alluded to by King & Spalding in their brief to the
Supreme Court, and by Justice Powell in his concurrence. In such a setting it seems un-
likely that a "bad marriage" would be entered into or continued for long, if there were
serious conflicts or an obvious potential for them, whether based upon protected class
status, personalities, political views, work habits, or anything else.
1985]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
business partnership.8 4 If one assumes that a partnership or profes-
sional corporation wishes to discriminate, then under the approach sug-
gested by Justice Powell, all that would be necessary is to admit
protected individuals into the business, give them nothing to do, and
pay them nothing for it. It seems doubtful that courts would ignore the
reality of such an egregious arrangement, or some other subtler effort at
discrimination.
The better approach would be to continue following jurisdictional
size requirements of the state or federal statute being applied. Depend-
ing upon the size of the particular partnership, it may be necessary to
review "right to control/economic realities" questions as to firm opera-
tion to determine whether the organization has enough employees for
jurisdiction to be asserted. If jurisdiction and liability are found, ques-
tions of control and economic realities should be reevaluated to deter-
mine what remedies may be appropriate.
C. Reection of Justice Powell's Concurrence
The Hishon decision mandates no specific remedy if discrimination
is proved.
One can fairly ask whether it is appropriate for a court to direct
admission of an unwanted partner into a partnership rather than order a
monetary remedy. There is no real basis in theory or in the statute for
treating professionals' businesses differently from other enterprises.
However, the practical problems of directing partnership admission with
the myriad of future issues regarding compensation, client responsibil-
ity, and management of the operation, which may all present future
problems requiring subsequent judicial action, certainly suggest a mon-
etary remedy rather than injunctive relief. As described above, current
case law provides a framework for regulating internal partnership deci-
sions on these matters, depending upon how the partnership is organ-
ized and operated. There is no good rationale for carving out blanket,
special exceptions from these rules for lawyers or other professionals.
Nevertheless, one would expect that great care would be utilized before
significantly altering management decisions. An individual's value to an
enterprise cannot really be judged by a mechanical formula. Further,
economic realities are such that not everyone makes it to partnership in
any given organization. 8 5 Certain hard data such as hours worked and
84. These are the categories of decisions Justice Powell specifically stated he would
not review. 104 S. Ct. at 2236 n.3.
85. One court has stated:
[Plaintiff] is in no way different from hundreds of others who find that they have
to make adjustments in life when the opening desired by them does not open.
This situation is not confined to medical schools. Of a hypothetical twenty
equally brilliant law school graduates in a law office, one is selected to become a
partner. Extensive discovery would reveal that the other nineteen were almost
equally well qualified. Fifty junior bank officers aspire to become a vice presi-
dent-one is selected. And, of course, even judges are plagued by the difficulty
of decision in selecting law clerks out of the many equally well qualified.
Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229, 1232 (2d Cir. 1974).
[Vol. 62:2
HISHON V KING & SPALDING
dollars of income generated through work performed and work gener-
ated by the individual can lead to tangible numbers. Other factors such
as management of the business and participation in a wide range of pro-
fessional and civic activities become quite difficult to assess. Firms, as
well as individuals within firms, vary widely in valuing these matters.
The Supreme Court has long taken the position that courts are not well
suited to second-guess or modify business judgments, 86 and one would
expect the courts to proceed with even greater care in this area. Where
violations of the discrimination laws have occurred, the courts should
act to remedy the violation as best they can. The subjective nature of
these internal decisions mandates the utmost care in formulating a
remedy.
8 7
Remedies must obviously vary with the facts of the particular case.
However, it is possible to suggest a potential framework for analysis in
dealing with issues of relief.
As a broad statement of the law, Justice Powell's suggested blanket
prohibition of review of internal partnership management decisions
should be rejected. Courts in the past have not hesitated to review deci-
sions of management where questions of discrimination are raised. Re-
viewing compensation or work assignment decisions, especially of
partners, is certainly fraught with difficulty. Courts have evaluated these
issues in assessing claims of discrimination by management employees
against large corporations, and there is no logical basis for distinguish-
ing lawyers in this setting from a large corporate employer. Of course,
willingness to modify such management decisions should vary, depend-
ing upon whether the entity has 250 or more professionals as opposed
to fifteen or twenty professionals, and the degree to which decisionmak-
ing is centralized within a particular organization. Size and management
structure should take on added importance in the setting of professional
partnerships. Ultimately, however, these are questions for the equitable
discretion of the court, not questions to resolve on the basis of a broad
hands-off policy.
Any review of management decisions made by professional organi-
zations will be difficult. This is true whether the decision involves evalu-
ations of progress, admission to partnership, or operation of a
partnership. Since the Supreme Court has initially determined that con-
sideration for partnership is a proper subject for Title VII review, it
86. See, e.g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). "Courts are gener-
ally less competent than employers to restructure business practices, and unless mandated
to do so by Congress they should not attempt it." Id. at 568.
87. An apt analogy for the courts may prove to be teacher tenure cases. See, e.g.,
Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1984); Lynn v. Regents Univ. of Cal., 656
F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 823 (1982). Courts have approached Uni-
versity tenure cases with care, noting the multitude of subjective factors involved in such
consideration. Tenure decisions are often made at a departmental level without either the
competitive or economic factors potentially involved in a partnership decision. Ultimately,
the range of subjective factors involved in a tenure decision or a partnership decision are
probably comparable. A pivotal distinction for the tenure cases may well be the size differ-
ence between a single department at a university and a multi-state law firm.
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seems likely that partnership management decisions, at least in larger
enterprises, will also be reviewed. Outcome will vary depending upon
the size of the firm and its management structure. The fewer the
number of people who are involved in making a particular decision, the
greater the likelihood that the decision will be the subject of judicial
review. There is little basis in the cases for adopting Justice Powell's
suggested blanket prohibition of review of internal partnership manage-
ment decisions, particularly when to do so would allow those intending
to discriminate to render Hishon's holding a nullity.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR LAw FIRM MANAGEMENT
Law firms must now take to heart the advice their labor lawyers have
been giving clients for years-review and upgrade management policies
and practices relating to hiring and promotion of professional employ-
ees. Recruiting practices should be reviewed to determine what kinds of
things are being said and done in order to attract new associates. This
could have an impact not only on defense of discrimination claims but
also on possible claims for breach of implied contract and other theories
which are exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine.
Training and evaluation policies should also be examined. While
evaluation criteria for professionals are more amorphous than for tech-
nical employees, efforts should be made both to formalize training and
to develop plans which advise professional employees of their progress.
This makes sense both in terms of Title VII compliance and in terms of
the substantial economic investment firms make in their professional
employees.
Serious consideration should be given to written reviews or evalua-
tions. It is unclear from the record in Hishon exactly what messages, if
any, were communicated to Ms. Hishon. It does not appear that any
written evaluation was given Ms. Hishon. The young lawyer may not get
the message which may well be conveyed in ambiguous, easily misinter-
preted terms. Certainly, this is not an uncommon phenomenon.
Some might argue that a written evaluation is in some way contrary
to the professional status of lawyers, accountants, brokers, or other indi-
viduals. Yet, if there is no written evaluation, it becomes very difficult to
reconstruct what was said in the evaluation process. Additionally, a writ-
ten evaluation has the advantage of forcing managers as well as profes-
sional employees to confront directly the progress toward partnership
and the plusses and minuses of an individual's performance.
While for many years they were collegial, intimate groups, organiza-
tions of professionals are increasingly becoming large business enter-
prises. They should review and upgrade their employment practices,
both because it is good management and because it will assist in defend-
ing claims of improper treatment. Failure to do so may rebound to their
detriment in the event of discrimination or wrongful discharge
litigation.
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V. CONCLUSION
Professional partnerships and corporations are now subject to Title
VII jurisdiction, at least to the extent of following nondiscriminatory cri-
teria in making partnership admission decisions. It seems likely, as well,
that judicial oversight will extend to internal partnership decisions in at
least some of the larger organizations, depending upon the degree of
centralization of management and the nature of the particular enter-
prise's decisionmaking processes.

